Effect of political ownership on the relationship between productivity and the cost of equity by Reza Mahdifard, Mohammad & Royayee, Ramezanali
             European Online Journal of Natural and Social Sciences 2013;                                                            www.european-science.com 
                Vol.2, No.3 Special Issue on Accounting and Management. 
                ISSN 1805-3602 
 
3176 
 
Effect of political ownership on the relationship between productivity and the 
cost of equity 
 
Mohammad Reza Mahdifard1*, Ramezanali Royayee 2 
1 Department of Accounting, College of Management and Economics, Tehran Science and Research 
Branch, Islamic Azad University, Tehran, Iran; 2Department of Cultural Affairs Management, 
College of Management and Economics, Tehran Science and Research Branch, Islamic Azad 
University, Tehran, Iran.                                         
 * E-mail: mahdifard1@yahoo.com 
 
Abstract 
This study is in the framework of theory of political economic and aims to analyze the effect 
of political ownership on the relationship between productivity and the cost of equity for company 
owners in Tehran`s stock exchange center. Companies in this study are divided into two groups: 
Companies with political ownership sovereignty and other companies. In this study, it is believed 
that political ownership becomes the ruler institution whenever the company`s main stock holders 
who own at least ten percent of the whole stock. The research method is relational with multi-
variables regression, and panel analysis is used in order to analyze the models. In a seven year 
period from 2006-2012, the studies have shown that political ownership is highly effective to the 
relationship between productivity and the cost of equity, and if the political ownership increases in a 
company, the relationship between productivity and the cost of equity increases too. Therefore it 
proves the effects of the study of using theory of political economy on the behavior of financial 
variables. 
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Introduction 
Political economy is an important domain in the scientific study of social phenomena. In this 
method, the formation of social phenomena is believed to be resulted by political and economic 
reasons. According to the theory of political economy, it is of vital need to understand the 
relationship between economic, social and political groups in order to identify the changing features 
of business enterprises and to interpret their economic and financial variables (Abeysekera, 2003). 
In developing countries with their economic system being dependent to relations, one of the main 
reasons affecting the motivation and behavior of investors and managers, is the feature of political 
managers and owners of the companies. The purpose of this study is the comparative investigation 
of effect of political ownership on the relationship between productivity and the cost of equity. 
Our paper contributes to the literature on several grounds: First, we contribute to the recent 
literature on the role of political ownership in determining the firm’s cost of equity, by introducing 
the Effect of political ownership on the relationship between productivity and the cost of equity. 
Second, we contribute to the debate on the link between government ownership/control and the firm 
productivity by examining its impact on the cost of equity. 
In Iran`s economic environment, it is unacceptable to have lots of beneficiaries with 
antithetical interests. In other words, government is the main actor in Iran`s economy. The existence 
of this powerful actor makes it hard to identify management from ownership. Although there are 
differences in their appearances, but differentiating management from ownership is not possible in 
Iran and the relations of managers and owners are not dependent to it. Therefore using theory of 
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political economy to describe the behavior of economic and financial variables is an accepted 
method.  
 
Theoretical foundations and research background 
 Theory of political economy   
 Since the second half of the 20th century with the expansion and influence of Liberalism, the 
theory of political economy entered economic texts all around the world. Not only has this theory 
gathered the attention of economists and politicians, but also sociologists have offered explanations 
for this theory (Moosavi et al. 2004). According to this theory, economy and politic interact with 
each other which mean political activity and decision making has direct and indirect effect on 
economic activities and vice versa. According to this theory, politicians and bureaucrats are 
motivated to transport wealth via political process. They are not just functionaries for beneficiary 
groups, but they are beneficiaries too. In addition their easy access to resources puts them in a better 
position in comparison to other actors in economic field. An actual example for this condition is 
direct existence of government or institutional investors and individuals being close to power 
entities in the structure of companies` ownership.  
 Political economy focuses on the fact that power relations as fundamental and determinant 
forces and processes in the market, should be a part of analysis. Excluding power relations in social 
or political or any other`s analyses would be unexplainable (Mosco, 2009). In the countries in which 
the legal system lacks the power to support the safety of private sector investors and there is 
corruption in an expanded scale, having political relations and being closer to government are 
considered high value elements for companies in order to bridge the market in this condition and 
avoid Ideological discrimination (Boubakri, 2012). Companies` owners subdivided according to 
their political position and economic abilities. Analyzing the effects of owners` investment on 
companies is a subject which could be analyzed in the framework of theory of political economic. 
 Research background   
Boubakri et al. 2012 research includes the cost of equity in companies which are closer to 
political powers. The results showed low cost of equity in the companies which are related to 
political entities. According to their research, there are powerful proofs that in companies related to 
political entities, investors expect low efficiency for cost of equity. Their reason is that these 
companies totally face little risks. Ben Nasr and Boubakri (2012) surveyed political factors 
determining the cost of equity by using a special database including the information about 126 
institutions transferred to private sector in 25 countries. The results show a high dependence of the 
cost of equity on political system and government stability.  
Aninat et al., (2010) analyzed the relationship between policy and productivity in the 
framework of the theory of political economy by using a model for the cost of political 
transformations. This survey tries to identify and describe those factors of political economy which 
are reducing productivity rate. According to analysis, political economy mechanism is the reason 
reducing productivity rate. Banimahd and Mohammadrezaee (2012) showed in their research that 
productivity directly affects the performance of non-profit companies and also productivity has an 
opposite relationship with overall losses. 
There are researches about the effect of ownership and political relations on economic 
variables. Ang et al., (2013) in their research in Singapore showed that political relations of 
companies have made little profit for them. Faccio (2006) surveyed companies in different countries 
and the results showed that the owners entrance to political relations increases companies 
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productivity. Wu et al., (2012) in their research for private companies in China showed that political 
management increases their productivity. These companies gain more value in comparison to others.  
Research hypothesis 
According to researches done in this area (for example, the researches of Boubakri et 
al.,(2012), Ben Nasr and Boubakri,(2012), Aninat et al., (2010)), the research hypothesis is 
presented as follows:  
H1: Political ownership affects the relationship between productivity and the cost of equity 
Population of the study  
The population in this research is the accepted companies in Tehran stock exchange in a 
period of 2006 to 2012 including 95 companies and related 602 observations which are chosen 
randomly in the following conditions: 
A) The companies in which March is their period end and they have no financial changes 
during that period. 
B) Companies which do not have long term lack of transaction during that period. 
C) Investment companies shall not be included in groups related to investment and Banking 
industry. 
After checking financial forms and related texts using database of Tehran stock exchange, 
the inputs were collected and calculated using excel software and were analyzed using SPSS18 and 
Eviews6. The inputs related to described statistics were analyzed through calculating central indexes 
such as average, mean and indexes of distribution SD. These indexes were calculated in a general 
way. Latter we examined the normality test for dependent variable. This exam was carried out using 
Kolmogorov–Smirnov test. Panel analysis was used to analyze models. The existence of effects 
(random or stable), in these models were examined and at the end the suitable ones were chosen. A 
meaningful level of deduction base was used in a way that whenever the examination`s possibility or 
level of meaningfulness is less than 0/05, the hypothesis will be 95 percent rejected.  
Research conceptual model and variables 
The research conceptual model is as follows: 
ܥܱܧ௜௧ = ߚ଴ +  ߚଵ ܴܲ௜௧ +   ߚଶܲ ௜ܱ௧ + ߚଷ ܴܲ௜௧  ×  ܱܲ +  ߚସ ܵܫܼܧ௜௧ + ߚହܮܧ ௜ܸ௧ +  ߚ଺ ܩܵ + ߚ଻ ܴܱܣ +  ߝ௜  
COE is the cost of equity, PR is productivity, PO is political ownership, Size is the size of company, 
LEV is liability ratio, GS is sales growing and ROA is the return on assets. 
Dependent variable for the shares (the cost of equity) (Easton, 2014) was calculated as follows: 
COܧ௧ = ටா௉ௌ೟ିா௉ௌ೟షభ௉೟షభ  
In described formula, the cost of equity (COE) is calculated in the year (t) from square of ratio of  
deference earning per share (EPS) of the year (t) and the previous year (t-1) on stock price (P) of the 
precious year.  
Productivity: Includes the productivity of human resources and capital. Riahi Belkaoui 
(1993), Total productivity is described as follows: 
Total productivity including human resource productivity and capital productivity with the 
following formula: 
TP = HRP + CP 
In above formula, TP is total productivity, HRP is the human resource productivity and CP is 
physical capital productivity. 
A) Human resource productivity: The calculation formula is ܪܴܲ = ்ௌ௏௏஺  
HRP is human resource productivity, TSV is total salary and wage and VA is value added. 
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The formula for calculating value added is as follows: 
VA = W + I + T + DP + DIV + R 
In this formula W is wage, I is interest, T is tax, DP is depreciation, DIV is divided interest and R is 
residual income(non-allocated profit).  
B) Physical capital productivity: The formula is ܥܲ = ்ி஺௏஺ , in which CP is capital 
productivity, TFA is total fixed assets and VA is value added. 
Political ownership: According to this research, political ownership rules a company, 
whenever the company`s main investors are as political groups dependent to government. The signs 
of company`s political ownership include: The existence of members of board of directors related to 
government, parliament and this type of political institutions or main governmental or semi-
governmental share-holders (with at least 10 percent of total vote shares). This variable is analyzed 
via investigating financial statements and board of directors` reports on general assembly through 
identifying director, board of directors, main owners and individuals dependent to described 
companies. This variable was used with a little difference in the researches of Jonson and Mitton 
(2003), Facio (2006), Aning Sejati (2009) and Cheni et al.(2012). We used two variables to calculate 
political ownership. In this method if the main shareholder of a company has political entity, the rate 
would be 1 and if it is not a political entity, the rate would be zero.  
Control variables of the research and their calculation method are as follows: 
1) Size which is identified base on total logarithm of each company`s assets in each year. 
2) Debt ratio is calculated via fraction of long term debts on assets. 
3) Sales Growing which means sales differences ratio in this year compared to previous 
year. 
4) Return on asset: means the ratio of net profit to total assets. 
 
Results 
H0: Inputs use normal distribution for dependent variable 
H1: Inputs do not use normal distribution for dependent variable 
 
Table 1: Kolmogorov–Smirnov test for testing normality of dependent variable of the research  
Year Quantity Normality Maximum difference Kolmogorov
–Smirnov Z 
ratio 
Possibility 
value Avera
ge 
Standard 
deviation
Absolute 
value 
Positi
ve 
Negative 
2006 87 0/40 0/24 0/14 0/14 -0/08 1/26 0/08 
2007 87 0/30 0/22 0/17 0/17 -0/10 0/77 0/59 
2008 85 0/29 0/23 0/14 0/14 -0/11 1/30 0/07 
2009 86 0/31 0/23 0/12 0/12 -0/12 1/14 0/15 
2010 87 0/34 0/24 0/16 0/16 -0/09 0/67 0/77 
2011 86 0/31 0/27 0/16 0/16 -0/14 0/61 0/85 
2012 84 0/30 0/22 0/20 0/20 -0/12 0/68 0/75 
 
Possibility value for dependent variable in the period of 2006-2012 is more than 0/05. 
Therefore the zero value (normality of variable) for this variable would be rejected and it means, the 
distribution of these variables is normal, as predicted by (indexes close to zero). 
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We used panel analysis without fixed effects, with fixed effects and with random effects for 
integrated data. Limer (Chao) test and Hasman test were used for identifying suitability of the model 
with fixed or random effects. Therefore we calculate the following hypothesis: 
H0: The integrated model is suitable 
H1: The model with effects is suitable 
Then, in the case of using effective model, the Hasman test is used to identify if the fixed effective 
model is suitable or randomly effective model. 
Zero and opposite hypothesis is Hasman test are as follows: 
H0: The randomly effective model is suitable 
H1: The model with fixed effects is suitable 
The results for Chao test are written in the following table: 
For Hasman test, the value for possibility is 0/000. Therefore the zero hypothesis is rejected and the 
model with fixed effects is suitable one. 
 
Table 2: Chao test and Hasman test to choose the best model 
Models Chao or Limer test Hasman test Result 
Effects` 
test 
Value Freedom 
ratio 
Possibility 
value 
K2 
value 
Freedom 
ratio 
Possibility 
value 
Model F value 2/63 (91/503) 0/00 15/38 7 0/031 Model 
with 
fixed 
effects 
K2 
value 
233/95 91 0/00 
 
  The possibility values in Chao test are less than 0/05. Therefore this model has dofferent 
effects on different companies. Now Hasman test is used in order to identify if these effects are 
fixed or random. The possibility values in Hasman test are also less than 0/05. Therefore the model 
has fixed effects on different companies. So the best model to use is the one with fixed effects. We 
have used this model to examine our next hypothesizes.  
 
Table 3: Fitting this model on the first model 
Parameters Ratio values (t) value Result 
Fixed value 0/615 1/711 Meaningless 
ROA 0/201 1/509 Meaningless 
PR -0/020 -5/080 Negative and meaningful 
PO -0/074 -0/839 Meaningless 
PR*PO 0/018 2/331 Positive and meaningful 
SIZE -0/026 -0/965 Meaningless 
lev 0/235 3/034 Positive and meaningful 
GS 0/019 0/761 Meaningless 
ROA 0/201 1/509 Meaningless 
F value 3/76 F possibility value 0/000 
The coefficient of 
determination 
0/42 Watson`s statistics 2/03 
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In above table, the model with fixed effects is examined. The F meaningfulness value is 
0/000. This value is less than 0/05. Therefore the zero hypotheses will be rejected with 95 percent of 
confidence. It means there are no trustworthy models on 95 percent of confidence level. The 
coefficient of determination is 0/42. Therefore 42 percent of dependent variable`s changes are due to 
independent variable and control variable. The value for Watson `s statistics is 2/03. The values 
which are close to 2, show a lack of autocorrelation for the remaining which is one of the regression 
hypothesizes. (Therefore the remaining lacks autocorrelations.) 
Hypothesis testing 
The value for (t) statistics for productivity (PR) is -5/08 (meaningful and negative), for 
political ownership (PO) variable, it is -0/84 (meaningless), for PR*PO variable, it is 2/33 (positive 
and meaningful), for size variable (Size), it is -0/96 (meaningless), for liability ratio variable (LEV), 
it is 3/03 (positive and meaningful), for sales growing variable (SG), it is 0/76 (meaningless), and 
for return on assets (ROA), it is 1/50 (meaningless), the value of (t) statistics for intercept is 1/71 
which in the level of 95 percent confidence does not reject zero hypothesis and it means that 
intercept is meaningless. 
 
Conclusion and Recommendations    
According to the fact that PR*PO variable is meaningful; therefore political ownership 
affects the relationship between productivity and the cost of equity. 
For accurate analysis of the hypothesis, first we should pay attention to the effect of 
productivity on the cost of equity. The results of table.3 show us that productivity (PR) is 
meaningful and negative. It means, the more productivity, the less the cost of equity. A key feature 
is that we should answer this question: In which ownership system, the inverse relationship between 
productivity and the cost of equity has maximum level? Second hypothesis shows that the effect of 
productivity on the cost of equity in companies with political ownership is higher than the ones with 
no political ownership. In other words political ownership meaningfully affects the relationship 
between productivity and the cost of equity, and the more the political ownership of companies, the 
more the relationship between productivity and the cost of equity. The results of this research are the 
same as the ones of Bani Mahd and Mohammad Rezaee research (2012).  
According to the results, it is suggested to build a suitable base for separation of the 
management from ownership, substantially. The privatization process is a good start to achieve this 
purpose. Therefore it is better that governments through changing their income-based strategy to 
privatization (delegation of companies in order to reduce debts and gaining capital for government), 
and with paying attention to customers` technical abilities, delegate companies to private sector, put 
limits on the semi-governmental institutions` investment in fields which the private sector has the 
ability to invest in.  
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